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Notes
It’s Always Windy in McCain Valley: Vicarious
Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
GEORGE A. CROTON*
This Note considers whether a federal agency that grants a license, lease, or permit
to a wind farm developer can thereafter be held vicariously liable for the developer’s
violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act’s (“MBTA”) “take provisions.” It
concludes by positing that a federal agency can justifiably and logically be held
vicariously liable in situations where the violation was both foreseeable and
inevitable.
Part I provides background to the question, discussing a recent circuit split over the
question, the interplay of the MBTA and the Administrative Procedure Act, and an
older circuit split over the meaning of the word “take” as applied to the MBTA. Part
II frames the various arguments made in the two cases that resulted in the recent
circuit split over the potential for federal agency vicarious liability. Part III analyzes
the text, history, and purpose of the MBTA; compares the issue of MBTA vicarious
liability to a similar and instructive line of cases arising under the Endangered
Species Act; and presents an argument for a “middle ground,” where federal
agencies can be held vicariously liable for not securing a take permit in scenarios
where the developer they are licensing will inevitably commit a violation of the
MBTA.

* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to
Professor Dave Owen and Eric Glitzenstein for all their help and advice. All my love to my grandmother,
Renee “Motsy” Cary.
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INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy production in the United States reached an
all-time high in 2015, representing 13.44% of all domestically produced
electricity.1 The Obama-era saw unprecedented enthusiasm for clean
energy; as of July 2016, the grant program established by section 1603
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act funded 105,733
projects, with total estimated private, regional, state, and federal
funding sitting at $90.2 billion.2 More than twenty states enacted
“renewable portfolio standards” requiring utilities to generate a certain
percentage of power from renewable energy sources.3 For many, the
1. Electric Power Monthly, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. tbl. 1.1 (2017).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OVERVIEW AND STATUS UPDATE OF THE § 1603 PROGRAM (2017).
3. Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx.
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prospect of our energy system making better use of potentially limitless
sources like solar and wind represents America’s future, free of the
threats of pollution and a changing climate.4
However, renewable energy comes with its own set of costs. Solar
and wind farms are typically extremely large, as the amount of energy
they are capable of producing is necessarily correlated with how much
space they take up.5 Studies show that a wind farm requires a whopping
46,000 acres of land in to order produce 1000 megawatts of power.6 A
concentrated solar power plant requires 6000 to 10,000 acres.7 By
contrast, coal-fired and nuclear power plants require 640 to 1280 acres
to produce the same output.8 Solar and wind projects often sprawl
across a combination of local, state, federal, and private lands,
triggering a complex interplay of guiding statutes and various agencies.9
The intrusive presence of large renewable energy projects has drawn the
ire of conservation groups, Native American tribes, and localities that
border or overlap with development sites.10 Not surprisingly, these
controversies frequently result in years of protracted litigation.
All in all, siting these large facilities often results in a variety of
bitter disputes. If there is one common thread, however, it is the
negative effects that the construction and operation of these facilities
can have on wildlife. Solar and wind farms are typically sited in
undeveloped areas, with public lands being favored.11 In many cases
these lands represent important habitats for endangered species. The
4. Steve Leone, Billionaire Buffet Bets on Solar Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Dec.
7, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2011/12/billionaire-buffett-bets-on-solarenergy.html.
5. The Solar Star solar farm occupies a 3200 acre site in the Mojave Desert. Eric Wesoff, Solar
Star, Largest PV Power Plant in the World, Now Operational, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 26, 2015),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-star-largest-pv-power-plant-in-the-worldnow-operational#gs._ih=kLw.
6. Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Animals: A History of Conflict, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE AND
ENERGY L. 159, 184 (2012).
7. Id. at 193–94.
8. Id.
9. See Rob Nikolewski, Expansion of Tule Wind Project OK’d by State, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Oct. 31, 2016, 11:40 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/
sd-fi-tule2-approval-20161028-story.html.
10. See generally Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito Cty., 217 Cal. App. 4th 503 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013) (challenging the county’s certification of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) regarding a
proposed solar power development in the area and the county’s cancellations of Williamson Act
agricultural land preserve contracts.); Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, 927 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Cal 2013) (noting that the Indian tribe was alleging that
Bureau of Land Management’s approval of utility-scale wind power project violated National
Historic Preservation Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Policy Act, National Environmental
Policy Act, Archaeological Resources Protection Act, Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, and Administrative Procedure Act).
11. Janine Blaeloch, Government Subsidies for Industrial-Scale Solar, SOLAR DONE RIGHT (Dec.
12, 2011), http://solardoneright.org/index.php/briefings/post/government_subsidies_for_indust
rial-scale_solar/.
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endangered desert tortoise and the destruction of its arid habitat are
frequently the subject of litigation in the court of Southern California.12
The construction of solar and wind farms destroys habitat necessary for
their survival and can damage eggs buried underground.13 Concentrated
solar thermal plants have been observed to practically vaporize birds in
midair due to the intense heat created by the fields of heliostat
mirrors.14 The endangered blunt-nosed leopard lizard, San Joaquin kit
fox, giant kangaroo rat, and big-horn sheep have all been subjects of
concern, as well as various plant species.15 However, the most visible
conflict between renewable energy production and wildlife may be the
damage that wind farms do to avian species. The spinning blades of the
enormous windmills are estimated to cause the deaths of at least
573,000 birds and 888,000 bats every year.16
The Tule Wind Project is a paradigmatic example of the types of
disputes that arise from the siting and development of a large wind
farm. First proposed by a company named Avangrid Renewables in
2004, the Tule Wind Project is slated to produce 201 megawatts of
power from a 12,000-acre site in San Diego’s East County.17 The site is
located in McCain Valley, a resource conservation area that
encompasses 38,692 acres of the In-Ko-Pah Mountains, one of
Southern California’s coastal mountain ranges.18 The proposed site is
largely located on federal land overseen by the Bureau of Land
Management, but extends into state lands managed by the California
State Lands Commission as well as private lands and tribal lands that
belong to the Ewiiaapaayp Band of Kumeyaay Indians.19 McCain Valley,
typical of the mountain ranges of Southern California, largely consists

12. Chris Mooney, Why Big Solar and Environmentalists Are Clashing over the California
Desert, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/
wp/2016/08/15/the-greens-and-solar-industry-agree-on-climate-but-they-cant-agree-on-the-califor
nia-desert.
13. See W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Defs. Of
Wildlife v. Jewell, No. CV 14-1656-MWF(RZX), 2014 WL 1364452 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014).
14. Morgan Walton, A Lesson from Icarus: How the Mandate for Rapid Solar Development
Has Singed a Few Feathers, 40 VT. L. REV. 131, 132 (2015) (“The workers called these birds
‘streamers’ for the image they created as the animals spontaneously ignited in midair and hurtled to
the ground in a smoking, smoldering ball.”).
15. Klass, supra note 6, at 194–95.
16. K. Shawn Smallwood, Comparing Bird and Bat Fatality-Rate Estimates Among North
American Wind-Energy Projects, 37 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN 19, 19 (2013).
17. Rob Nikolewski, Tule Wind Project Takes Another Step, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 26,
2016, 3:46 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tule-wind-fight-2016jul26-story.html.
18. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, DESERTUSA,
https://www.desertusa.com/mccain/oct_mcain.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
19. Nikolewski, supra note 17; see also Bureau of Indian Affairs Approves Tule Wind Farm
Lease, EAST COUNTY MAG. (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/bureau-indianaffairs-approves-tule-wind-farm-lease.
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of untouched chaparral.20 The valley is hot and dry, home to bighorn
sheep, great horned owls, antelope, and various other wildlife.21 It also
represents prime breeding habitat for golden eagles.22 In 2014, roughly
fifty breeding pairs of golden eagles were found to be threatened by the
prospect of encroaching human development in San Diego County.23
Needless to say, the prospect of the construction of the Tule wind farm
and the potential threat it posed to eagles and other species sparked a
fierce backlash.
The goal of this Note is to provide an answer to the central
question that arose from the litigation over the Tule Wind Project. That
question is whether a federal agency acting in a permitting or licensing
capacity can be held vicariously liable for Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(“MBTA”) violations committed by a third-party developer. In this
Note, I argue that it can, but only in limited situations where the
violation is completely foreseeable and inevitable, and where the
agency’s permit or license is a proximate and but-for cause of the
violation.
Part I discusses the Ninth Circuit case that arose from the dispute
over the Tule Wind Project, Protect Our Communities Foundation
v. Jewell, as well as a very similar case from the D.C. Circuit, Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Hopper.24 It describes
the statutory bases for the plaintiffs’ claims, as well as an old and well
developed circuit split over how to interpret the “take provision” of the
MBTA. Although that split is largely beyond the narrow scope of the
question that this Note tackles, discussing it is useful for framing the
issues here. Part II explores the arguments and counterarguments
raised by the parties in Protect our Communities and Public Employees
and then frames the overarching question of this Note through those
arguments. Part III analyzes the text, history, and purpose of the MBTA
and then describes the application of the federal agency vicarious
liability argument in Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) take cases, as well
as the differences and similarities between the ESA and MBTA. Finally,
Part III articulates the circumstances in which a vicarious liability claim
should, and should not, succeed under the MBTA.

20. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, supra note 18.
21. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, supra note 18.
22. Advocacy, PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES FOUND, http://protectourcommunities.org/advocacy
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
23. Morgan Lee, Windfarm Plan Rebuffed over Eagle Impacts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept.
29, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-eagle-lawsuit-against-windfarm-2014sep29-story.html.
24. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2016); Pub. Emps. for
Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

I – CROTON_11 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

652

2/10/2018 10:16 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:647]

I. BACKGROUND
In 2014, the San Diego-based conservation nonprofits Protect Our
Communities Foundation and Backcountry Against Dumps brought an
action in the federal district court for the Southern District of
California, challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”)
decision to authorize development of the Tule Wind Project.25 The
plaintiffs alleged that the BLM’s approval of a right-of-way for the wind
project violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the MBTA, and the Bald and
Golden Eagles Protection Act (“BGEPA”).26
The plaintiffs attacked various perceived failings in the preparation
of the Environmental Impact Statement required by NEPA.27 They also
argued that either the BLM or the developer were required to obtain a
“take permit” under the MBTA, claiming that the project would
inevitably cause the deaths of golden eagles through habitat destruction
or collision with wind turbines or transmission lines.28 On motion for
summary judgment, the district court found that the BLM had satisfied
the mandates of NEPA, and that although the court was “deeply
troubled by the project’s potential to injure golden eagles and other rare
and special-status birds,” the agency was not required to secure a take
permit under the MBTA or BGEPA.29 The plaintiffs filed two separate
notices of appeal, with Protect Our Communities Foundation solely
addressing the MBTA issues.30
The plaintiff’s MBTA arguments eventually became the centerpiece
of the appeal. Protect Our Communities Foundation argued that
through the APA, the Bureau itself could be liable for violations of the
MBTA’s take provisions attributable to bird deaths caused by the wind
farms to whom they granted a lease.31 The Ninth Circuit found this
argument untenable, holding that the BLM could not be held liable for
bird deaths caused by the wind farm it had licensed, and thus was not
required to secure an MBTA take permit.32 The court held that the act of
granting a right of way was not sufficient to render the BLM liable for
the deaths of birds ostensibly caused by the wind farm itself, and that
the statute did not contemplate secondary liability of this nature.33
Furthermore, the court found that there was no requirement to obtain
25. Complaint at 1–2, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, No. 3:13-cv-00575-JLS-JMA, 2014
WL 1364453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d at 571.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 3, 22.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 578.
31. Id. at 585.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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an MBTA take permit prior to construction, because the language of the
lease required the developer to comply with all “applicable laws and
regulations.” The court reasoned that the BLM could withdraw its
right-of-way approval at any time if it determined that the developer
failed to comply with those provisions.34
Across the county, and around the time that the Ninth Circuit
issued its ruling, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) were required to ensure that another wind farm obtain an
MBTA take permit.35 That wind farm, the Cape Wind Energy Project, is
cut from the same basic cloth as the Tule Wind Project. Various
conservation groups challenged a proposal to build and maintain 130
wind turbines in the Horseshoe Shoal region of Nantucket Sound.36
Nantucket Sound is a crucial habitat for threatened or endangered
migratory birds, including roseate terns and piping plovers.37 According
to the FWS, at the end of the summer and beginning of fall, “there is the
potential that every breeding adult roseate tern in the northeast
population . . . will be in Nantucket Sound, within twenty miles of the
Cape Wind Project area.”38
The plaintiffs in Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility asserted that the proposed turbines were guaranteed to
kill eighty to one hundred endangered roseate terns and at least ten
threatened piping plovers over the life of the project.39 As in Protect
Our Communities, the lease granted to Cape Wind by the BOEM
contained language requiring compliance with all applicable laws.40 In
the Ninth Circuit, that language was enough to excuse the agency from
ensuring that a MBTA take permit was secured prior to construction.41
However, in the D.C. Circuit, the developer and the agency both
conceded at oral argument under pressure from the panel that the
take permit had to be obtained by one of them in order to comply with
the statute.42 The D.C. Circuit ruled accordingly, taking them at their
34. Id. at 587.
35. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1088 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(declining to reach the question outright, as Cape Wind and the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management both conceded that a permit was required to comply with the MBTA, stating “we take
the defendants at their word that the lease requires a migratory bird permit and that Cape Wind will
apply for one.” The court arguably drew this concession out at oral argument, as addressed below).
36. Id. at 1080-81.
37. Id. at 1088.
38. Brief for Appellant at 9, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, No. 14-5301, 2015
WL 3465970 (D.D.C. May 26, 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
39. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088.
40. Id.
41. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016).
42. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein & Eubanks LLP (Feb.
21, 2017) (on file with author); see also Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088 n.11.
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word.43 In light of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the plaintiffs in Protect
Our Communities Foundation requested an en banc hearing, but were
denied.44
Thus a form of circuit split was born, albeit in a roundabout way.
Although the D.C. Circuit declined to directly address the issue after the
agency conceded the point, these subtly contradictory holdings pose an
important question. Does incidental take of a protected species that
results from the construction and operation of wind farms implicate the
liability of the federal agency governing their development? Or would
that liability amount to what the Ninth Circuit deemed “attenuated
secondary liability” beyond the scope of the statute?45
A. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
The “International Convention for the Protection of Migratory
Birds” between the United States and Great Britain (acting for Canada)
eventually led to the codification of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918.46 The act was an effort to protect migratory bird species in
reaction to population decline that was the result of overhunting and
the trade in birds and their feathers.47 Since 1918, similar conventions
between the United States and four other nations have been made and
incorporated into the MBTA: Mexico (1936), Japan (1972), the Soviet
Union (1976), and again with Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union.48 The act is one of the earliest examples of federal
environmental laws, and currently lists 800 species as protected.49
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the motivations behind the
enactment of the statute represented “a national interest of . . . the first
magnitude.”50 The Treaty “recited that many species of birds . . . were of
great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to
vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of
adequate protection.”51

43. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 588.
44. Nikolewski, supra note 17.
45. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 585.
46. Martha Harbison, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Explained, AUDOBON SOC’Y (May
22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-migratory-bird-treaty-act-explained.
47. Id.
48. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.
gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratory-bird-treaty-act.php (last updated
Dec. 3, 2017).
49. Id.
50. Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
51. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted).
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The MBTA states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase,
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be
shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport
or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any
part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not
manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms
of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for
the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 [without
a permit or express waiver] . . . .52

Unlike other more recent examples of environmental legislation,
such as the ESA or Clean Water Act, the MBTA provides only for
criminal enforcement by the United States.53 It does not contain a
citizen suit provision to allow for civil suits seeking to ensure federal
agency compliance.54 However, the D.C. courts, and now arguably the
Ninth Circuit, follow the view that claims brought under the APA can
enforce MBTA limitations against federal agencies.55
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Enacted in 1946, the APA governs the way in which federal
administrative agencies propose and establish regulations.56 Former
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Senator Pat McCarran called
the APA “a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans
whose affairs are controlled or regulated” by federal agencies.57 The
basic purposes of the APA are to require agencies to keep the public
informed of their organization, procedures, and rules; provide for
public participation in the rulemaking process; establish uniform
standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudication; and
to define the scope of judicial review.58
52. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
53. JOHN C. MARTIN ET AL., CROWELL MORING, THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT: AN OVERVIEW
(2016), https://www.crowell.com/files/The-Migratory-Bird-Treaty-Act-An-Overview-Crowell-Mor
ing.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“Through the APA’s prohibition against unlawful agency action, a plaintiff may bring a civil suit to
compel agency compliance with the MBTA.”); City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2004).
56. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).
57. DONALD D. BARRY & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 32 (3d ed. 2005).
58. Ralph F. Fuchs, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, Prepared
by the United States Department of Justice; The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the
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Under the APA, agency decisions must be upheld unless the court
finds that the decision or action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”59 Agency action
taken “without observance of procedure required by law” may also be
set aside.60 In short, the APA serves the dual purposes of providing
guidelines for agencies and acting as an enforcement mechanism for the
public.
C. THE INCIDENTAL TAKE SPLIT
The issue of vicarious federal agency liability that arose in Protect
Our Communities and Public Employees must be framed in the context
of a more developed split over the general purpose of the “take”
provision in the MBTA. The word “take” is one of the most heavily
litigated terms in wildlife law. While this is especially true in the context
of the ESA, the MBTA has also seen its fair share of controversy.61 The
FWS defines “take” for MBTA purposes to mean “pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”62 This definition clearly
encompasses intentional harm like hunting, trapping, or poisoning.
There is a great deal of confusion, however, as to whether it should be
extended to activities that inadvertently or unintentionally cause the
deaths of birds. Examples of these activities include logging, petroleum
industry operations, the construction of telecommunications towers,
and of course the operation of wind turbines.63 In 2001, President
Clinton explained that for the purposes of the MBTA, “‘[t]ake’ means
take as defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12, and includes both ‘intentional’ and
‘unintentional’ take.”64 President Clinton did not clarify whether this
definition refers solely to hunting or poaching activities or instead could
be any activity that incidentally harms birds.65
Some courts interpret the “take” provision of the MBTA narrowly,
requiring activities affirmatively intended to harm birds. For example,
in United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a defendant petroleum corporation was not liable
under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory birds that had become

Administrative Agencies, Vol. VII of the New York University School of Law Institute Proceedings,
23 IND. L.J. 362 (1948).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
60. Id. at § 706(2)(D).
61. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
62. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2017).
63. Cf. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 (explaining that the ESA’s take provision includes “harm.”
Additionally, agency regulations and the Supreme Court have defined “harm” to include habitat
modification and other unintentional damage).
64. Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 10, 2001).
65. Id.
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trapped in open-air oil production facilities.66 The CITGO court
principally relied on Justice Scalia’s dissenting argument in Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon.67 The
Fifth Circuit held that “take” means “to reduce those animals, by killing
or capturing, to human control,” and that “[o]ne does not reduce an
animal to human control accidentally or by omission; he does so
affirmatively.”68
Other courts have held that the MBTA imposes strict liability, and
does not distinguish intentional acts from acts that accidentally or
indirectly kill birds. In United States v. FMC Corp., the Second Circuit
held that a corporation engaged in the manufacture of a highly toxic
pesticide was subject to MBTA liability for failing to prevent the
chemicals from reaching a pond where it harmed protected birds.69 The
court found that:
The principle here is the same as in the tort situation even though in
this case the [chemical] remained on the property of [the
corporation], and the birds found their way to the attracting . . . pond.
When one enters into a business or activity for his own benefit, and
that benefit results in harm to others, the party should bear the
responsibility for that harm.70

Similarly, in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc. the Tenth
Circuit found that the MBTA rendered the taking or killing of migratory
birds a strict liability crime, and that it was not necessary to prove that
defendants violated MBTA with specific intent or guilty knowledge.71
The Apollo Energies court found that “[a]s a matter of statutory
construction, the ‘take’ provision of the [MBTA] does not contain a
scienter requirement.”72
Perhaps surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit has generally followed the
narrower interpretation of the MBTA’s take provision.73 This view may
be shifting, however. While not addressed outright, a sense of
acceptance of the applicability of the take provision to incidental take
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See generally U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 489.
Id.; see also Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 907.
U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 686.
See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991):

These cases do not suggest that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths,
amounts to the ‘taking’ of migratory birds within the meaning of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act. We are not free to give words a different meaning than that which Congress and the
Agencies charged with implementing congressional directives have historically given them
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act. Habitat destruction
causes ‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but does not ‘take’ them within the meaning of
the MBTA.
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scenarios is implicit in Protect Our Communities, at least where the
take is inevitable or foreseeable.74 The court did not address the split
over the definition of take as described above, focusing instead on the
issue of third party federal agency liability.75 The court held that the
“argument that the Project will inevitably result in migratory-bird
fatalities, even if true, is unavailing because the MBTA does not
contemplate attenuated secondary liability on agencies . . . that act in a
purely regulatory capacity[.]”76 This implicit acceptance may be due to
the fact that the BLM themselves have conceded that the MBTA
encompasses incidental take resulting from wind turbine operations.77
This concession mirrors FWS’s own view that the MBTA encompasses
incidental take.78
All in all, the split over the definition of MBTA take is ripe for a
Supreme Court decision or a legislative alteration. The issue of federal
agency liability presented by Protect Our Communities and Public
Employees is, in a sense, merely one facet of that overarching
argument. The questions posed by both issues are closely related,
however. What kinds of acts or omissions can result in MBTA liability,
and how broad is the statute’s reach?
II. RECENT MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT LITIGATION OVER THE
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
A. THE ARGUMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF THE MBTA TO AGENCY
ACTIONS
The goal of the plaintiffs in both Protect our Communities and
Public Employees was, of course, to try and prevent future harm to
protected migratory bird species. The plaintiffs tried to achieve this goal
in part by forcing compliance with the permitting requirements of the
MBTA and BGEPA.79 Importantly, the plaintiffs were initially not trying
to force the lead agencies in both projects to obtain the MBTA take
permit. Rather, the objective was to ensure that a responsible party
obtained the permit in general.

74. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42.
75. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (noting
that agency regulations and the Supreme Court have defined “harm” in ESA’s take provision to
include habitat modification and other unintentional damage).
78. Notice of Intent, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (May 26, 2015).
79. Forcing the developer or agency to obtain the permits would not have stopped the project
from being built, of course, and would not have prevented the harm to protected species. The goal
here was likely to ensure accountability, open the door to criminal liability, and possibly stall the
development process.
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B. PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES FOUNDATION
In Protect Our Communities, the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal
was based on a straightforward syllogism: (1) the Tule Wind Project,
like other large industrial wind projects, will inevitably and foreseeably
kill migratory birds . . . (2) under the MBTA, the only way in which the
killing of migratory birds may be authorized is through a permit issued
by the FWS . . . [and] BLM’s authorization for Tule Wind to construct
and operate a project on federal land that BLM knows will violate the
MBTA cannot be deemed federal agency action that is “in accordance
with law” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)[.]80
Tule Wind had taken the position as an intervenor-defendant that
it was not required to obtain a take permit at all, citing the Fifth
Circuit’s CITGO decision where the court found that the take provision
only extended to affirmative actions intended to harm migratory
birds.81 Thus, it was clear that Tule did not intend to obtain a permit,
and the plaintiffs felt that the responsibility must fall on the lead
agency.82 The BLM, on the other hand, conceded that “MBTA liability
plainly extends to non-hunting activities that incidentally but directly
take migratory birds such as wind-turbine operations,” and that the
Tule Wind Project would itself kill birds protected by the MBTA.83 The
BLM contended that they had nonetheless not acted “contrary to law”
within the meaning of the APA.84 The BLM relied on the fact that Tule
had adopted a “Project-Specific Avian and Bat Protection Plan for the
Tule Wind Project” which required “compliance with all applicable
laws.”85 However, while the plan contained multiple references to other
environmental protection statutes like the ESA and the Clean Water
Act, it did not incorporate the MBTA.86 Furthermore, the BLM
maintained that it could not be sued under the APA, arguing that the
strictures of the MBTA did not extend to third parties who merely
authorized the activities of an entity that may have the effect of
resulting in the incidental take.
Relying in large part on the D.C. Circuit case Humane Society of
the United States v. Glickman, the plaintiffs argued that “the notion
that the availability of an MBTA-based APA claim should turn on
80. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.
2016) (No. 14-55842, 14-55666), 2015 WL 416884.
81. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 2; Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein,
supra note 42.
82. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 2.
83. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
84. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 4–5.
85. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 4–5.
86. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 5.
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whether a federal agency is undertaking an action itself or, rather,
authorizing someone else to undertake the very same action makes no
legal or logical sense.”87 In Glickman, plaintiffs challenged the
Department of Agriculture’s “Integrated Goose Management Program,”
which was an attempt to control an exploding Canada Goose population
that was harming crop yields and contaminating water supplies.88 The
plan called for various measures including harassment, habitat
alteration, capture, and killing.89 The court held that federal agencies
could be considered “persons” who may be held criminally liable for
violating the Act or the Treaty.90
The BLM argued that Glickman was distinguishable, as in that case
the Department of Agriculture had been directly causing the deaths of
protected birds, whereas the BLM was merely a third party granting a
lease to a developer.91 The Ninth Circuit eventually agreed, finding the
language in the right-of-way requiring compliance with all applicable
laws and regulations was sufficient to ensure that Tule complied with
any MBTA requirements if the need arose.92
C. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
The MBTA issues and arguments presented in Public Employees
were largely the same as those in Protect Our Communities. In Public
Employees, the plaintiffs argued that the BOEM authorization of the
Cape Wind project violated the MBTA.93 They likewise argued that the
authorization was not “in accordance with law” within the meaning of
the APA; and that Glickman applies where an agency authorizes
another party to engage in certain conduct if that party could only
proceed after receiving that authorization.94 The BOEM raised the same
attenuated liability counterargument as the BLM, contending that it
had already imposed significant measures to protect migratory birds by
requiring adoption of the Avian and Bat Mitigation and Monitoring
Plan as a condition of Cape Wind’s lease.95
The major distinction between the two cases lies with the
concessions made by Cape Wind and the BOEM. In Protect Our

87. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 6; see also Humane Soc’y of the U.S.
v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
88. Glickman, 217 F.3d at 884.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 571 (No.
14-55666), 2016 WL 2902816.
92. Id. at 9–10.
93. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 40, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d
1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-5303), 2015 WL 3465970.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15.
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Communities, the Ninth Circuit found that the language of the BLM’s
lease meant that the BLM was not required to ensure Tule preemptively
obtained an MBTA permit.96 In response to the pressured questioning
of the panel at oral argument, in Public Employees the BOEM and Cape
Wind conceded that the language of their lease required the agency to
ensure that MBTA permits were secured prior to construction.97
The BOEM and Cape Wind’s concessions meant that the D.C.
Circuit could decline to directly address the issue of vicarious agency
liability.98 Thus, the opinion of the Public Employees court did not
explicitly contradict the Ninth Circuit’s finding in Protect Our
Communities that MBTA liability did not extend to agencies acting in a
licensing capacity. However, that possibility may have been the
underlying threat that led to BOEM and Cape Wind conceding that the
permit was required. The question remains: do the strictures of the
MBTA extend to agencies licensing or authorizing the activities of
entities whose activities will cause the taking of bird species protected
by the MBTA?
III. FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
COMMITED BY DEVELOPERS THAT THEY LICENSE
The text and legislative history of the MBTA provide a framework
for a court to logically justify extending liability to third party federal
agencies. Furthermore, comparable wildlife protection statutes are
instructive and provide examples of when holding agencies liable in
their permitting and licensing capacities is justified. Finally, there is a
way to limit the applicability of the vicarious liability theory that will
curb the risk of unlimited secondary liability.
A. THE HISTORY, TEXT, AND INTENT OF THE MBTA
The MBTA was largely enacted in response to the decimation of
migratory bird populations by direct take like hunting. Rampant
overhunting of migratory birds for their feathers (known as “millinery
murder” because the feathers were primarily used for women’s hats)
was the major impetus that led to Congress passing the MBTA.99 As one
96. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 578.
97. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42; Pub. Emps. for Envtl.
Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088 n.11.
98. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42.
99. Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ANIMAL LEGAL &
HISTORICAL CTR. (2014) (noting that the MBTA was preceded by the nation’s first wildlife
conservation law, the Weeks-McLean Act, which was passed in response to the same issues that the
MBTA addressed. The Weeks-McLean act was quickly challenged on the basis of the historical right
of the states to regulate wildlife and was declared unconstitutional).
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senator stated, the MBTA was intended to “keep pothunters from killing
game out of season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining the
country by it.”100 These direct take origins, and the common law roots of
the term “take” itself, form the basis of the CITGO decision declining to
extend the MBTA to instances of incidental take.101 This logic can be
extended from the incidental take issue to the vicarious liability issue
presented in Protect Our Communities. If the statute only contemplated
hunting at the time of enactment, what basis is there for extending its
restrictions to a federal agency granting a lease to a third party? While
the history and text of the statute do not provide an overt basis for
extending liability to an overseeing agency, they do seem to indicate
that the statute can and should encompass incidental take scenarios. It
follows that the statute’s restrictions could logically be extended to an
agency if that agency’s action is both a proximate and but-for cause of
harm.
B. MOTIVATIONS BEYOND HUNTING
The MBTA came about in reaction to overhunting, but the benefits
offered by migratory bird species were also used as a justification for
acting to protect them. The primary justification cited was the fact that
they provided a reliable means of protecting crops by consuming
damaging insects.102 Congress took notice of the annual food losses
sustained by insects and used the numbers as a basis for the passing the
MBTA.103 In the first major Supreme Court challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute, the Court held that it saw “nothing in
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food
supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are
destroyed.”104 Congress also recognized the inherent aesthetic value of
migratory birds.105 The MBTA guaranteed that migratory birds would
continue to be part of America’s aesthetic recreation by “[providing a]
place where [migratory birds] can come and remain safely and be a
pleasure and companions.”106 Furthermore, the list of protected species
included “a number of songbirds and other birds not commonly

100. Hye-Jong Linda Lee, Note, The Pragmatic Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Protecting
“Property,” 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 649, 652 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
101. U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2015).
102. Lee, supra note 100, at 662.
103. Lee, supra note 100, at 653.
104. Mo v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920).
105. 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918).
106. Id.
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hunted.”107 Congress imposed criminal penalties on those who killed
these birds as well as on persons who hunted game birds.108
There were thus numerous motivations behind enacting the statute
besides combatting overhunting. This implies that the purpose of the
statute was not strictly to keep hunters and trappers from
indiscriminately killing birds, but rather to protect the bird populations
from harm regardless of how that harm occurred.
If one of the goals of the statute is to ensure that migratory bird
species continue to feed on crop-damaging insect species, then it should
make no difference whether those birds are purposefully harmed by
hunters or incidentally by wind turbines. By that same token, if the
statute is intended to prevent harm to endangered birds, it should not
matter whether the entity being held liable is an individual or an
agency. This was the foundation of the Glickman decision, which held
that for the purposes of the MBTA, there is no material difference
between requiring the same level of compliance from a federal agency
as is required from individual hunters.109 It follows that if a developer is
unable to undertake the action that will foreseeably harm protected
birds without the approval of a federal agency, then the agency is a
proximate cause of the harm and should be held equally liable.
C. LATER TREATIES REACHED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
The MBTA came about as a result of the United States entering a
treaty with Great Britain: the “Convention with Great Britain [on behalf
of Canada] for the Protection of Migratory Birds.”110 As described above,
the United States went on to enter into similar agreements with several
other countries.111 These treaties were then incorporated into the
provisions of the MBTA, although each treaty differed in its scope and
goals.112
As described previously, the Canadian Convention cited the
importance of migratory birds as a food source and predators of crop
damaging insects as the main reasons for entering into the treaty.113 The
Mexican Convention, however, focused more broadly on preserving
migratory birds “for purposes of sport, food, commerce, and
industry.”114 The Japanese and Russian conventions went even further,
107. U.S. v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 259 (9th
Cir. 1978).
108. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 532.
109. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
110. Convention Between United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
111. Lee, supra note 100, at 665.
112. Lee, supra note 100, at 665.
113. Lee, supra note 100, at 665.
114. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb.
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announcing the general goal of enhancing the environment of migratory
birds, finding them a natural resource of great recreational, aesthetic,
scientific, cultural, ecological, and economic value.115
Each successive treaty also broadened the scope of the species of
protected birds. The Canadian Convention defined protected birds as
migratory game birds, migratory insectivorous birds, and migratory
non-game birds.116 By contrast, the Mexican Convention listed
protected families of migratory birds without specifying the species
included in such families.117 The Japanese Convention broadened the
list of protected birds to non-migratory birds common to both Japan
and the United States.118 The Russian Convention included species and
subspecies that migrated between the two countries and those with
separate populations sharing common breeding, wintering, feeding, or
molting areas.119
These international attempts to protect migratory birds, each
increasing in scope and drawing from a broadening array of
motivations, provide an indication of the extent to which the United
States government has historically been concerned with protecting
migratory bird species. If a sovereign nation enters into a treaty with
another in order to achieve a certain purpose, the administrative
agencies of that country should be held to the same standard of care and
responsibility as the country itself. On this basis, it is reasonable to
require that government agencies ensure that private parties acting
under their supervision comply with applicable statutes like the MBTA
or face the same liability for noncompliance as the private party.
D. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
The broad, comprehensive prohibitory language of section 703 also
provides a foundation for an argument for imposing liability on
agencies acting in a regulatory or permitting capacity. The long list of
forbidden actions, some of them vague, is an indication that the act was
intended to guard against a wide range of possibilities and provide
protection in general rather than counter specific intentional
activities.120 “While hunting and poaching were made illegal by the

7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311, 1312.
115. Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction in their
Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 979 U.N.T.S. 149; Convention Concerning the Conservation
of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647, 4649.
116. Convention Between United States and Great Britain, supra note 110, at 1702.
117. Lee, supra note 100, at 654.
118. Lee, supra note 100, at 654.
119. Lee, supra note 100, at 654.
120. Rozan, supra note 99, at 2.
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MBTA, so were accidentally steering a wagon over a bird’s nest or
picking up an egg shell.”121
No definitions or descriptions are offered for the activities
forbidden by the statute.122 The act forbids not only pursuing, hunting
and taking protected species, but also causing them to be bought, sold,
or transported.123 The same protections apply to parts of birds and their
eggs or nests.124 The MBTA gives the Secretary of the Interior the
authority to
carry out the purposes of the conventions . . . having due regard to the
zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic
value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migratory flight of such
birds, to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means,
it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting,
taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest,
or egg thereof . . . .125

The misdemeanor charge of the MBTA amounts to a strict liability
crime, as did the felony provision prior to amendments made in 1986.126
By the plain terms of the statute, it is possible for an entity to be found
guilty of violating the MBTA without having intended to commit the
prohibited act.127 The strict liability nature of the MBTA’s misdemeanor
penalty provisions formed the basis of the United States v. FMC Corp.
and United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., decisions.128 One of the goals
of the statute was to provide a strong incentive against causing harm to
migratory bird species generally, as it required no element of intent or
knowledge. At least one court has held that the MBTA applied to taking
and killing “by any means or in any manner.”129 That court found that
the Act did not “suggest in any way that only direct applications of force
constitute ‘killing’ or ‘taking,’” and that the plain language of the Act
made it clear that intent was “irrelevant.”130
On its face, the statute does not contemplate who causes the harm
or how. It simply seeks to prevent harm to the listed species in general,
and punish those responsible for causing that harm. “As legislation
goes, [section] 703 contains broad and unqualified language ‘at any
121. Rozan, supra note 99, at 2.
122. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I.
123. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
124. Id.
125. Id. at § 704(a).
126. Id. at § 707(a); Rozan, supra note 99, at Section III.E.
127. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section III.E.
128. U.S. v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d
679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010).
129. U.S. v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 1999) (quoting
16 U.S.C § 703(a)).
130. Id. at 1078.
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time,’ ‘by any means,’ ‘in any manner,’ ‘any migratory bird.’”131 Broad,
vague language and penalty provisions are an indication of legislation
that can justifiably be construed broadly, which would explain the wide
variation in interpretations that courts have applied.132 The statute bars
a wide range of activities that can potentially harm migratory birds and
their nests, and grants the Secretary of the Interior purview to enforce
both the provisions of the statute and the treaties.133 It follows that the
statute protects migratory bird species generally, rather than
prohibiting harmful activities specifically. Moreover, under the
Glickman court’s logic, there is no reason the statute should not also
apply to federal agencies.134 So if harm to protected bird species is
completely foreseeable, and will not occur but for an action taken by an
agency, the statute’s terms do not prevent MBTA liability from being
extended to an agency acting in a third-party regulatory capacity.
E. THE ESA AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The general concept of holding agencies vicariously liable for
actions that harm protected wildlife is not a new one. In fact,
attempting to hold agencies vicariously liable under the ESA has been a
popular strategy in recent years.135 As one commentator put it, “the
leverage vicarious liability gives to environmental preservation
advocates is simply irresistible.”136 That said, academia has not
embraced the theory, and its success in the courts has fluctuated.137
Critics justifiably warn that “almost no private action takes place in the
complete absence of some connection to government regulation,” and
that a well-developed vicarious liability doctrine for “permitting and
licensing liability” could lead to near limitless application of liability to
agencies and governmental bodies.138 Nonetheless, the ESA cases lay a
strong foundation by analogy for applying the theory in MBTA
permitting situations.
F.

NOTABLE CASES

“In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, [] the Eighth Circuit held that
EPA’s ‘decision to register pesticides’ made the agency liable for illegal

131. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
132. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I.
133. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I.
134. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571 (9th
Cir. 2016) (No. 14-55842), 2015 WL 416884.
135. J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 70, 70 (2001).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 70, 75.

I – CROTON_11 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

February 2018]

IT’S ALWAYS WINDY IN MCCAIN VALLEY

2/10/2018 10:16 AM

667

taking of protected species resulting from use of the pesticides.”139
Farmers and ranchers had been using bait laced with strychnine to
eradicate pesky rodents, but the black-footed ferret a protected
species was also consuming the bait.140 “[T]he court found [the] EPA
liable because the strychnine could only have been distributed with
[the] EPA’s registration approval.”141 The court stated that “strychnine
can be distributed only if it is registered” and that “the EPA’s decision to
register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these
registrations was critical to the resulting poisonings of endangered
species.”142 The court found that “the relationship between the
registration decision and the deaths of endangered species [was]
clear.”143 The court based its theory of vicarious liability on National
Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, in which “[t]he FWS had authorized the
use of lead shot, ammunition which resulted in secondary poisoning of
bald eagles.”144 The Hodel court also “held the FWS’s authorization
constituted a taking under the ESA.”145
“Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Yeutter, [] the Fifth Circuit ruled that
the Forest Service’s approval of a timber management plan for a
national forest made the agency liable when the private timber
harvesting” damaged a crucial habitat of the protected red cockaded
woodpecker.146 The court found that the Forest Service did not
“completely implement the provisions” of its wildlife management
handbook when it had permitted clearcutting within two hundred feet
of the woodpecker’s preferred trees.147 The court found that this course
of conduct impaired the woodpecker’s “essential behavioral
patterns.”148 The court held that this failure to adequately implement
the requirements of the handbook constituted a taking under the
ESA.149
The ESA vicarious liability argument has been applied to state and
local governments as well as federal agencies.150 In Strahan v. Coxe, the
leading vicarious liability wildlife case, the First Circuit found the state
of Massachusetts liable for harm to whales caused by commercial

139. Id. at 71 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Defs of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1301.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 23 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
145. Id.
146. Ruhl, supra note 135, at 71 (citing Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1991)).
147. Yeutter, 926 F.2d at 438.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 439.
150. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
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fishing operations.151 The court held that “it is not possible for a licensed
commercial fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating the
ESA by exacting a taking.”152 The defendants argued that the statute was
not intended to prohibit state licensure activity because such activity
could always be found to be a “proximate cause” of the taking.153 The
defendants pointed to common law tort principles and argued that “the
district court improperly found that its regulatory scheme ‘indirectly
causes’ these takings.”154 The First Circuit disagreed, finding that “[t]he
causation here, while indirect, is not so removed that it extends outside
the realm of causation as it is understood in the common law.”155
The Eleventh Circuit has seen the argument extended to its utmost.
In Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia County, female loggerhead turtles
approaching a beach to nest were turned away by bright lights, and
hatchlings turned away from the water confusing the bright lights for a
full moon.156 “[T]he Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff turtles had
standing to sue the county to allege ‘harmfully inadequate regulation’ of
lighting in violation of the ESA” “because the county had the authority
to regulate municipal and private beach lighting.”157 The county which
had been granted an incidental take permit argued that the FWS had
impliedly contemplated that the county be excepted from liability for
any incidental take that artificial beachfront lighting caused.158 The
county based its argument on the fact that FWS had required it to
survey every light source, study their impacts and implement methods
to correct light sources that disorient sea turtles.159 The court disagreed,
finding that the incidental take permit exception to the take prohibition
did not apply to activity performed as a purely mitigating measure upon
which a permit is conditioned.160
Just as the use of strychnine bait by farmers in Defenders of
Wildlife required the permission of the EPA, and just as the fishing
operations in Strahan required permits granted by the state of
Massachusetts, the Tule Wind Project could not have been built without
the BLM’s approval.161 The causal chain is not so fine as to be
impermissibly attenuated; it is in fact rather short and stout. There

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia Cty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 1998).
Ruhl, supra note 135, at 72 (quoting Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1250).
Loggerhead Turtle 148 F.3d at 1236–37.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1242.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 1.
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must be limits, however, lest an endlessly spiraling and completely
unworkable theory of liability ensues. Those limits were what concerned
the court in Protect our Communities, and are addressed below.162
Furthermore, the MBTA is not the ESA. While ESA “take” cases provide
analogous guidance, the statutes differ in several ways.
G. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ESA AND MBTA, CITIZEN SUIT
PROVISIONS, AND THE ROLE OF THE APA
The MBTA and the ESA are fundamentally different statutes. Some
commentators have opined that the “cause to be” language in the MBTA
“refers not to those enabling the act of shipping or carrying, but seems
to refer instead to those coordinating that act.”163 This contrasts with
the language of the ESA, which explicitly includes government entities
responsible for providing permits, even though those entities are not
coordinating the permitted activity.164 However, as discussed above, an
agency acting in a permitting or leasing capacity in a situation like the
development of the Tule Wind Project is still both a but-for and
proximate cause of impermissible take, and would thus arguably fall
within the “cause to be” language.
Furthermore, the MBTA unlike the ESA does not contain a
citizen suit provision.165 Only Department of the Interior officials are
empowered to enforce the MBTA.166 At least in the context of ensuring
that take permitting requirements are met, the APA potentially solves
this problem. The D.C. Circuit has explicitly held that an individual
citizen or citizens’ group can enforce limitations against federal
agencies using civil injunctions brought under the APA, and the Ninth
Circuit seems to have accepted this basic premise in Protect Our
Communities.167As was the situation in Protect Our Communities and
Public Employees, the combination of the APA and the MBTA results in
a form of makeshift citizen suit provision. While not capable of
implicating federal agencies in actual regulatory violations, the APA at
least provides a method by which an interested non-governmental party
can attempt to ensure that requisite permits are obtained.

162. See infra Part III.I.
163. William M. McLaren, Comment, An Endangered Theory: Vicarious Liability Under the
Endangered Species Act, 44 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1216 (2014).
164. Id. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with FWS or NMFS to
ensure protected species will not be jeopardized as a result of “any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency.” Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
165. Martin, supra note 53, at 1.
166. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012).
167. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Protect Our
Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016).
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H. THE MIDDLE GROUND FORESEEABILITY AND INEVITABILITY
In Protect Our Communities, the Ninth Circuit found that
stretching the MBTA and APA to encompass administrative agency
permitting actions would be a step too far.168 The court found that the
BLM “only authorized Tule to construct and operate a wind energy
facility on public lands, and therefore did not act to ‘take’ migratory
birds without a permit within the meaning of the MBTA.”169 As to the
question of whether the agency’s actions were in accordance with the
requirements of the APA, the court found that “the APA does not target
regulatory action by the BLM that permits a third party grantee like
Tule to engage in otherwise lawful behavior, and only incidentally leads
to subsequent unlawful action by that third party.”170 The court stated
that “[t]he causal mechanism in question is too speculative and indirect
to impose liability on the BLM for engaging in routine regulatory
action.”171 The court further found that the plaintiff’s claim “verge[d] on
argument for unbounded agency vicarious liability” and that BLM’s
right-of-way “did not sanction or authorize the taking of migratory birds
without a permit; it authorized the development of a wind-energy
facility.”172
These concerns reflect the criticisms of the vicarious liability theory
as applied to the ESA, as well as the concerns raised by opponents of the
incidental take theory. Where should liability end? Critics of the
incidental take theory are fond of raising the slippery slope argument,
and justifiably so.173 Unfortunately, lots of things kill migratory birds.
Domestic cats kill approximately 2.4 billion birds each year, far more
than wind turbines (although one may assume that they do not often
attack bald eagles).174 Could the owner of a cat be liable under the
MBTA? Birds also frequently die from flying into glass windows. Could
a homeowner be liable for MBTA take?
The concerns over the limits of the application of the MBTA to
incidental take situations are substantially the same as those for the
vicarious agency liability argument. Commentators have noted that
“[a]ny major land development or resource extraction project these
days requires a multitude of permits, often from federal, state, and local
governments.”175 There is always a risk that a major development action

168. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 586–87.
169. Id. at 585.
170. Id. at 586.
171. Id. at 586–87.
172. Id.
173. U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 447, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
174. Cats and Birds: A Bad Combination, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, https://abcbirds.org/
program/cats-indoors/cats-and-birds (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
175. Ruhl, supra note 135, at 74.
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or activity requiring some form of federal agency approval can result in
the taking of a listed bird. The defense in Strahan argued that:
the Commonwealth’s licensure of a generally permitted activity does
not cause the taking any more than its licensure of automobiles and
drivers solicits or causes federal crimes, even though automobiles it
licenses are surely used to violate federal drug laws, rob federally
insured banks, or cross state lines for the purpose of violating state
and federal laws.176

The vicarious liability argument is volatile, and if given free rein
can indeed result in the “unbounded agency vicarious liability” the
Ninth Circuit was so afraid of.
There is a middle road, however, which can tether the theory and
make it more viable. It lies with the foreseeability and inevitability of
the take, and whether the take could not occur but for the agency
granting the permit or license. This essentially formed the basis of the
court’s holding in Strahan:
[W]hereas it is possible for a person licensed by Massachusetts to use
a car in a manner that does not risk the violations of federal law
suggested by the defendants, it is not possible for a licensed
commercial fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating
the ESA by exacting a taking. Thus, the state’s licensure of gillnet and
lobster pot fishing does not involve the intervening independent actor
that is a necessary component of the other licensure schemes which it
argues are comparable.177

In Protect Our Communities, the Tule Wind Project was being
built on BLM lands, and could thus only have been built if the BLM
granted Tule a lease.178 The plaintiffs argued that the environmental
impact statement incontrovertibly showed that the Tule Wind Project
would have “‘unavoidable adverse impacts’ to migratory birds,” in that a
number of bird species in the area “regularly fly at heights that will
place them directly in the turbines’ vast ‘rotor swept area.’”179 There was
no question as to whether the turbines would cause the deaths of birds
listed under the MBTA.180 Similarly, in Public Employees, the plaintiffs
pointed out that “FWS prepared a draft biological opinion that found
that the turbines would directly kill at least 80 to 100 roseate terns and
ten piping plovers over the minimum twenty year life of the project.”181
If the projects were to go ahead, the deaths were inevitable, and
completely foreseeable. The defendants in Public Employees conceded
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163–64 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2016).
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 6–7.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 7.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 10.
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that this was reason enough to secure the take permit prior to
construction, as they were guaranteed to violate the MBTA otherwise.182
This is a very different situation from granting a driver’s license
without knowing whether the grantee will then use that license to drive
a car to commit a crime. It is also different from installing a window or
adopting a cat without being certain that it will not kill an endangered
bird. Even operating an oil processing facility that birds may or may not
fly into is dissimilar. In this situation, a federal agency grants a lease to
enable the building of a project while fully aware that the project is
guaranteed to kill protected birds. In the language of tort law, this
amounts to proximate cause. The harm is not only entirely foreseeable,
but can be traced directly back to the granting of the lease.
That reasoning leads to my proposed solution to the dilemma of
federal agency obligations under the MBTA, and the circuit split.
Specifically, in the limited situation where an action requiring a federal
agency’s permit or license will inevitably cause a take, an agency must
require MBTA permitting as a condition of issuing an authorization. If it
fails to do so, its authorization may be set aside as arbitrary and
capricious.
The danger of unlimited liability lies with extending vicarious
liability into situations where the harm is not foreseeable or inevitable
and cannot be directly traced to the federal agency’s action. A federal
agency is tasked, sometimes specifically and sometimes broadly, with
easing and ensuring the administration of federal law. As such, it is not
absurd to ask that a federal agency ensure that third-party developers
comply with federal law. The BLM could have stipulated that Tule
obtain an MBTA permit prior to construction, as it did with provisions
of other comparable environmental statutes, but it did not.183 This
would not have changed the fact that the third-party developer was still
held ultimately responsible. The potential for holding an agency liable
in this context simply provides a strong incentive for ensuring that
agencies granting leases or permits comply with the letter of the law
themselves.
CONCLUSION
Renewable energy might be the way of the future, but transitioning
to an energy infrastructure rooted in wind and solar will not come
without costs. Wind turbines kill eagles, and the legislature and society
in general have deemed these avian creatures and other migratory birds
worth protecting. In order to incentivize achieving this goal, federal

182. Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 23; Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra
note 42.
183. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 12–13.
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agencies can and should be held to the same standards of care and
liability as private entities, as the D.C. Circuit held in Glickman.
Holding an agency like the BLM vicariously liable for its licensing and
permitting activities to ensure that they mandate grantee and
lease-holder compliance with MBTA take permitting requirements
furthers this goal. Limiting its applicability to situations like that of
Protect Our Communities and Public Employees, where the take is
certain to occur, keeps the liability theory from spinning out of control.
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